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THE TWO-WORLDS ARGUMENT
AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF
PLATO'S METAPHYSICS
by William

J. Prior

In the final argument of the first part of the Pannenides, Plato raises an objectiori
to the separate existence of Forms. This argument, which I shall call the "TwoWorlds Argument" 1 (TWA), takes up more space than any of the other arguments against the Theory of Forms (TF), occupying almost two Stephanos
pages (133a-134e). It is, moreover, the only argument in the series about which
Plato permits Parmenides
to offer an editorial comment, the comment being
that the argument is the most serious objection to the TF, but that it can be answered. In spite of this assessment, which I believe represents Plato's own view,
the TWA has not received the attention of its more celebrated relative, the Third
Man Argument (TMA); and such attention as it has received has not been favorable. Thus, the TWA has not been taken by scholars to have the importance Plato ascribes to it, and has not been treated as a turning point in Plato's thought.

The scholars who disparage the TWA are wrong, however. In spite of some
problems involving the correct formulation of the argument, problems which
have given rise to the notion that the argument can be given a "quick fix" resolution, the TWA is j_n fact a very serious objection to the TF, and Plato's response to it in the late dialogues does take the form of the long and laborious
argument Parmenides says is required (133b-c). In this paper I shall attempt to
analyze the impact of the argument on the TF in such a way that Plato's judgment of its force is vindicated. First, I shall state the argument itself. Then, I
shall argue that a formulation of it that has recently gained some acceptance is
inadequate,
and provide a valid formulation
of the argument. Third, I shall
argue that a well-known response to the argument fails to bring out its true
force, _and attempt to do so myself. Fourth, I shall indicate briefly what I take
Plato's actual response to the argument to have been.
I. The Argument
Parmenides
begins his argument by assuming a principle on which he and
Socrates have insisted repeatedly in the preceding portion of the dialogue: that
the Forms exist in separation
from their phenomenal
participants,
in and of
themselves
(cf. 129d; 130b, c, d; and 133a). From this assumption
he draws the
implication that the Forms do not exist in our world, the world of becoming: "I
think that you and anyone else who posits the existence of an essence of each
thing 'itself in itself' will agree that none of these objects exist among ourselves" (133c3-5). Socrates agrees that the transcendent
being of the Forms precludes their immanent being.
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Parmenides continues:
However many of the Forms are what they are in relation
to one another, then, have their being themselves in relation to themselves, but not in relation to their likenesses,
or in whatever way one posits them, among ourselves, of
which we have a share and after which we are called each
thing. These things among ourselves, on the other hand,
being homonymous
to those, exist for their part themselves in relation to themselves and not in relation to the
Forms, and are named what they are named in relation to
themselves
and not in relation to those. (133c8-d5)
To explain this principle, Parmenides uses the example of master and slave.
The Form of Master is what it is in relation to the Form of Slave, whereas human
masters are what they are (i.e. masters) in relation to human slaves (133d-e). In
like fashion, the Form of Knowledge will be Knowledge in relation to Truth itself (i.e. the Forms), whereas our knowledge will be knowledge of the things
around us (134a-b). Since we do not possess the Forms and they are not in our
world, and since knowing the Forms involves possessing the Form of Knowledge, it follows that we cannot know the Forms: "Unknown to us, then, are what
the Beautiful itself is and the Good and all those things which we suppose to be
Forms themselves"
(134b14-c2).
Next Parmenides
goes on to bring out a consequence
of separation
"even
more terrible than this one" (134c4). The Form of knowledge must be "more precise by far" (c6-7) than the knowledge which we possess. The only being fit to
partake of it would be a god; but a god related to the Form of Knowledge would
be entirely cut off from our world.
Therefore if this precise Mastership
and this precise
Knowledge are with the god, this Mastership
of the gods
would never be mastership
of us, nor would their Knowledge ever know us; but just as we do not rule them by
virtue of the rule which exists among us, they by the same
argument are not masters of us, nor do they, being gods,
know human matters. (134d9-e6)
II. Interpretation
In discussing the proper interpretation
and formulation of the argument just
presented, I shall confine my comments to the views of three writers: Cornford,
Forrester, and Lewis. 2 All three claim that the argument is invalid, but they disagree on the nature of its defects. Cornford claims that the argument is fallacious because "It confuses the Form (Mastership
or Knowledge) with perfect
instances of the Form."3 Forrester diagnoses this confusion as the acceptance
of the Self-Predication
assumption; he agrees that Plato's argument "rests on"
that assumption,
but finds an additional fault with it, which I shall discuss below. 4 Both Forrester and Cornford have been effectively answered on this point
by Lewis, however, who has shown that we need not assume Self-Predication
in
order to make sense of the argument. 5 We need not assume that Mastership is
master of Slavery, or that Knowledge knows Truth; all we need assume is that
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Mastership is what it is in relation to Slavery, and that Knowledge is what it is
in relation to Truth (in general, that the proper correlate of an entity of a certain
type is another entity of the same type).
Both Forrester and Lewis see the main drawback of the argument in another
area. They assume that, when Parmenides
says of Forms that they are what
they are in relation to themselves and not in relation to their phenomenal likenesses, and that phenomena are what they are in relation to themselves and not
in relation to Forms, his point is merely the restricted one mentioned above:
that the proper correlate of an entity of a given type is another entity of the same
type. This does not justify the conclusion that we cannot know the Forms, or
that the gods, who know the Forms, cannot know us, however, because the relation involved in knowledge is not the same as the relation of being a proper correlate, and to preclude the possibility of one relation between types is not to
preclude any other. 6
The weakness of this interpretation
is precisely that it leads to the conclusion Lewis and Forrester reach, namely that the argument is invalid and, moreover, not a serious objection to the Theory of Forms. 7 We need not read the argument in this way, however. If we assume that, when Parmenides asserts that
Forms are what they are in relation to Forms and phenomena likewise in relation to phenomena, he means to preclude an_y relation between the two orders of
being,s we can construct a valid argument for Parmenides' conclusions. Let us
suppose that Forms and the gods are the inhabitants of the world of Being, and
that we and the images of Forms are inhabitants of the realm of Becoming. If no
relation is possible between entities in one realm and entities in another, then it
follows from the fact that knowledge and mastery are or involve relations that
we cannot know the Forms, and that the gods cannot know or rule us. Ifwe take
this interpretive
line we must concede that the general principle of unrelatedness between the orders is not established by the example of Mastership and
Slavery Parmenides uses to explain the principle, and in fact that the example
is in some respects misleading;
but that should cause us no problems. The
example is not offered as more than an illustration,
and the reader of the previous arguments will have come to expect a measure of deviousness and chicanery from Parmenides.9
This interpretation
of the argument has its own problems, which I shall deal
with in the next section, and it seems no more likely on the basis of the text of the
argument than the other. The reason for preferring this interpretation
of the
argument to the one offered by Forrester and Lewis lies in the fact that it makes
it much easier to understand and accept the judgement of Parmenides on the
merits of the argument. At the very outset of the argument, after Socrates has
acknowledged
that there are great difficulties in the postulation
of separate
Forms, the following exchange takes place:
"Know well, then," he said, "that soto speak you do not yet
grasp how great is the difficulty of this, if you posit one
Form as something always separate from each thing."
"What do you mean?" he said.
"There are many other difficulties,"
he said, "but the
greatest is this." (133a11-b4)
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The clear sense of Parmenides'
remarks is that the TWA, which he is about to
state, is a more serious objection to the TF than any he has so far raised, and also
that it is more serious than any of the objections he has not yet stated. In particular, it is a more serious objection than the TMA, the second version of which
he had just completed. Although Plato certainly puts in the mouth of his Parmenides positions which he, Plato, does not accept, there is no reason to think
that here he is expressing
anything but his own view of the argument. As a
valid argument is clearly a better candidate for a serious objection to a position
than an invalid one, we ought to prefer the valid formulation
in this case, provided that the Parmenidean
claim that this argument is the most serious objection to the TF can be given some plausibility.
In the next section I shall argue
that it can.
III. Possible Responses to the Argument
Even if, as I have urged, the TWA is given a validformul11,tion, it can be shown
that it is a serious objection to the TF only if it turns out that Plato is committed
to, or has no grounds for rejecting, the argument's premisses. Initially, at least,
this seems most unlikely. As Cornford has pointed out, the middle Platonic dialogues contain doctrines at odds with the assumptions
of the TWA. In particular, he notes that the view of the soul presented in the Phaedo is incompatible
with the restriction of 'us' entirely to the world of Becoming, and the doctrine of
recollection offers an account of how it is possible for us to know the Forms. 10
Cornford's approach to the argument can be augmented. It seems safe to say
that a proponent of the TF as it is found in the middle dialogues would accept the
independent
existence of Forms, but not the independence
of phenomena.
According to the theory of causation outlined in the Phaedo, the sole explanation of the beauty of a beautiful thing is that thing's participation
in the Form of
Beauty; and so in every case (100c4-6). The example of Parmenides
seems to
show that a man is a master if he stands in a certain relation to a human slave;
but the causal theory of the Phaedo rejects all such explanations
in favor of the
explanation
that a man is a master if he participates
in the Form of Mastery.
It would seem, then, that the middle Platonic dialogues contain the material
for a rejoinder to the TWA, and that this shows that the TWA is not a fair criticism of the TF as Plato actually expounded it. The difficulty with this view,
however, is the same that applies to the Forrester-Lewis
interpretation
of the
argument itself: it does not enable us to make sense of Parmenides'
remarks
about the argument. If such a rejoinder were possible, the TWA would hardly be
a serious objection to the TF; it would instead be a straw man, which a competent proponent of the TF could easily knock down. Now Parmenides does indicate that the TWA can be answered, but not in this rather simple and straightforward manner. Rather, an adequate response would require considerable talent and energy on the part of both the proponent of the TF and the objector:
If someone should say that it is not proper to know things
such as we say the Forms must be, one would not be able to
prove to one who said this that he spoke falsely, unless the
disputant happened to be of great experience and not with-
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out natural talent, and were willing to follow the demonstrator a great distance, laboring over a great many
things; otherwise the one contending that the Forms could
not be known would be unconvinced. (133b4-c1)
Parmenides'
remarks indicate two things. The first is that something is
wrong with the argument, and Plato is aware of that. The second is that he does
not believe that the argument can be dealt with merely by pointing out a fallacy
in the reasoning or a premiss which is not acceptable to a proponent of the TF.
Refuting the objection requires a long, far-ranging,
elaborate and difficult argument, and an argument which could succeed only against an opponent who
was highly intelligent. This being the case, Plato must think the TWA a more
serious objection to the TF than I have so far indicated.
There appear to me to be two reasons for taking the argument seriously. The
first is that in it Plato recognizes for the first time the principle that the transcendence of the Forms is incompatible
with their immanence, that the Forms
cannot be both in space and not in space. The role of the Forms as objects of
knowledge requires their exclusion from the world of phenomenal flux; their
causal role, as outlined in the Phaedo, requires their inclusion in that world.1 1
If the Forms cannot be both transcendent
and immanent, one of these roles must
be abandoned; but which?
The second point is more important than the first. We have seen that a proponent of the middle period TF would respond to the TWA by bringing up the doctrines of the soul, recollection,
and causation asserted in the Phaedo. All of
these doctrines depend on the existence of a coherent, intelligible relation of
participation
between Forms and phenomena. According to the Phaedo's theory of causation, the cause or reason for a phenomenon's
possession or acquisition of a characteristic
is nothing but its participation
in the appropriate Form.
The possibility of recollection depends on the existence of a relation of participation between phenomena and Forms; without this, the experience of phenomena could not remind us of the Forms. The immortality of the soul, also, which
is required if the soul is not to be confined to the world of becoming, depends
ultimately on an isomorphism
between relations which hold between Forms
and relations which hold among participants
in Forms (Cf. Phaedo 102d-103a,
104b-c, 104e-105a); without this, the proof that Soul is always connected with
Life and thus excludes Death would be irrelevant to the question whether the
individual soul is immortal.
Thus, every doctrine that relates inhabitants
of the world of Becoming to inhabitants of the world of Being depends ultimately on the establishment
of a
relation of participation
between members of the two worlds. Yet the existence
of such a relation is just what cannot be assumed at this point in the dialogue!
Plato in the middle dialogues described participation
in two ways: as sharing
and as resemblance. The arguments at Parmenides 130e-131e have shown that
participation
cannot be understood as sharing, at least if that relation is understood literally; the second version of the TMA, at 132c-133a, has led to the rejection of resemblance as the analysis of participation.Nor
has the Socrates of the
dialogue been able to come up with an alternative conception of participation
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which can withstand Parmenides'
objections. It may be, for all Socrates has
been able to show to the contrary, that there is no relation of participation
at all,
because the idea of such a relation between entities of different types is unintelligible. In that case, appeal to the middle dialogues' doctrines of the soul, of recollection, and of causation would be idle, and the complete separation of the
two worlds would be a real possibility. If the two worlds do turn out to be completely separate, as Parmenides asserts in the TWA, then it would seem to follow that knowledge of the Forms would be both impossible for us and irrelevant
if possible, in much the same way that Kant's noumenal world is irrelevant to
his phenomenal world (at least, as his critics claim).
IV. Plato's Response
It has turned out that the TWA is a serious objection to the TF of the middle
dialogues, and the complete separation of the two worlds of Being and Becoming has to be taken by Plato as a serious possibility. Given what Parmenides
says about the argument, we should expect a long, complex, far-ranging
answer to be offered to it in the later dialogues. That, I think, is just what we get.
The late dialogues provide a metaphysical
view in many respects similar to
that of the middle dialogues, but with some novel elements. At least some of
these new elements seem designed to respond to the problem raised by the TWA.
The most important of these developments
is Plato's revision of the theory of
causation in the late dialogues. a revision that gives prominence to the efficacy
of Nous, Reason, in the person of the Demiurge. In the Phaedo, Socrates had
reluctantly abandoned hope for an explanation of the cosmos of this sort, and
had resorted instead to the deuteros plous of the Forms as the sole causal principles (97b-100c). In the Timaeus, however, when the question of the cause of
Becoming comes up, Plato refers not to the Forms but to the "craftsman" ("de28a6), "maker" ("poieten," 28c3), and "father" ("patera," ibid.) of the
miourgos,"
cosmos. The Forms retain a causal role, as patterns (paradeigmata;
cf. 28a7,
28c6-29a3); but the primary emphasis in the revised theory of causation is on
the creative activity of a rational and benevolent deity. In this new scheme, participation (which is still treated in terms of the relation between pattern and
image) is not hypothesized
as a primitive, inexplicable relation between two·
otherwise independent
worlds; rather, the resemblance
of the phenomenal
world to the intelligible is explained as the result of the Demiurge's creation of
the phenomenal world in the image of the intelligible (Timaeus 28c-31b). In introducing the revised theory of causation and the Demi urge, Plato is following
the hypothetical method of the Phaedo (101d-102a): when the hypothesis of the
existence of a relation of participation
between Forms and phenomena is challenged, as it is in the Parmenides, he deduces the hypothesis from a higher one,
in this case the existence of a benevolent and rational god who formed the world
after the pattern of the Forms.
I believe that the new theory of causation which appears first in the Timaeus
is the core of the long and elaborate answer to the TWA Parmenides said was
possible. Timaeus presents the Demiurge in terms that strikingly recall the
account of that answer Parmenides had given: "The maker and father of this
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whole it is both a task to find and impossible to explain to everyone when
found" (Timaeus 28c3-5). The Demiurge, once introduced, continues to play a
role in the late dialogues, as is shown at Sophist 265b-c, Politicus 270a, andPhilebus 26e-30e. The argument in favor of the relation of the two worlds (which
remain as separate in the Timaeus as in the middle dialogues, as 27d-28a and
52b-d show) via the activity of the Demiurge is certainly elaborate, intricate,
and far-reaching, requiring most of the Timaeus for its exposition. In addition,
the hypothesis of the existence of a god who is concerned with the phenomenal
world itself requires an elaborate defense, which Plato provides in Laws X.
V. Conclusion
I have attempted to interpret the TWA so as to justify Parmenides' estimation
of its nature, on the assumption that Parmenides'
estimation is really Plato's.
This is not, I think, a point which can be proven. If we make this assumption,
however, we find it borne out by the interpretation
of the TWA I have offered,
and by the program of the late dialogues. As I have interpreted the argument,
it is both valid and a serious objection to the TF, one which demands, as Parmenides states, a long and elaborate answer. If we do not interpret the argument in
this way, I do not see how we can take Parmenides' estimation of it at face value.
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is controversial.
Gregory Vlastos has argued, in "Reasons and Causes in the Phaedo," in Vlastos, ed., Plato I: Metaph,vsics and Epistemolog,v
(Garden City: Doublesday,
1971), pp. 139-143, that the only things that are in the phenomenal
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